Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science
Volume 6

Article 21

1953

Decline of the Florentine Republic from the Invasion of Henry VII
to the Dictatorship of Walter of Brienne
Marvin B. Becker
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas
Part of the European History Commons

Recommended Citation
Becker, Marvin B. (1953) "Decline of the Florentine Republic from the Invasion of Henry VII to the
Dictatorship of Walter of Brienne," Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science: Vol. 6 , Article 21.
Available at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol6/iss1/21

This article is available for use under the Creative Commons license: Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC
BY-ND 4.0). Users are able to read, download, copy, print, distribute, search, link to the full texts of these articles, or
use them for any other lawful purpose, without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more
information, please contact scholar@uark.edu.

Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 6 [1953], Art. 21

THE DECLINE OF THE FLORENTINE REPUBLIC
FROM THE INVASION OF HENRY VII

TO THE DICTATORSHIP OF WALTER OF BRIENNE
MARVIN BECKER

University of Arkansas
From the time of the invasion of Henry VII to the establishment of the
dictatorship of Walter of Brienne (1311 to 1342), there was a significant change
in the Florentine pattern of political organization.
This change was not
confined exclusively to the City of the Red Lily, but was general throughout
Northern Italy. The commune, the medieval political form, was declining. The
Principate was emerging as the dominant governmental form. The simple dictatordisplaced the complex communal
ship (the proto- fasci sm of the Renaissance)
organization of the Middle Ages. Each of the several classes and political
parties of Florence demonstrated an incapacity for governing.
The orders of the
fourteenth century each tried to establish a government.
The nobles, the
guildsmen, the artisans, and workers each failed like their mythical ancestors-the Romans of the last days of the Republic--to establish a stable government.
They were unable to solve the problems which threatened the continuation of
Republican life. 1
Pasquale Villari writes:
We have only to draw a comparison between the
Divine Comedy and the Decameron to instantly perceive how deep was
" the change a
few years had wrought in the spirit of Florence and of all Italy. 2 This shift,
according to Villari, is one from the medieval to the modern "wel tanschaung.
This transition is paralleled by a political shift from commune to dictatorship.
Alfred von Martin and Sapori, both believe that the cultural and political
3 However, two pieces of
literature are
aspects are inexorably bound together.
to support this contention.
Caggese, the greatest of the modern historians of Florence, believes that
the period from Dante to Boccaccio demonstrates "how little control men have
over events." 4 The political and cultural changes during this period were
caused by a strange and inexorable destiny which pressed on all parties and
classes.
The authorities are agreed that there was a significant change.
It
would be something less than valid methodology to accept
destiny" as the causal
5
force.
Are there any more concrete reasons for the change? The answer to this
question will be the chief concern of this paper.
At the beginning of the fourteenth century the Italian communal republics
seemed secure.
Florence had been under the rule of the greater guilds for
almost 20 years.
The Empire, the greatest threat to the Republic of Florence,
had declined immeasureably from the days of Frederick II(1250). The Papacy had
lost a great deal of its secular power and was virtually a prisoner of the
French King. 7 With the decline of these two forces one would expect the republic of the Red Lily and the other Northern Italian towns to emerge as selfconstituted, republican states.
Why was it that the converse of this occurred?
The late Middle Ages witnessed the triumph of the commune of Florence over
feudal nobles. A republic of wealthy merchants and guildsmen supplanted the
aristocracy.
The City of the Baptist was a commercial and manufacturing town. 8
Who was better prepared to maintain that level of prosperity--even increase it-than the haute bourgeoisie?
Instead of peace, trade and security at the moment of its triumph, with its
old enemies lying prostrate, the city was beset with civil war, depression and
dictatorship. How can the decline of Florence's political institutions be
Why did the old pattern break at the "apogee" of its apparent
explained?
political success?
The prosperity of Florence, at the end of the thirteenth century, was
predicated on the wool industry. Fundamental to the wool industry were agrarian conditions.
It was essential to the woolen guild (arte di lana) that there
not

sufficient evidence

*
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be an improvement of the breeding of sheep and an improvement of pasture land. 9
After 1293, the control of the government came into the hands of the wealthy
families. These powerful merchants exhibited little concern for the state of
agriculture and animal husbandry.
What is even more significant, they were
As a result, there
actually contemptuous of the plight of the sheep raisers.
was very little opportunity for the Florentines to compete with the higher
quality wool production of the Low Countires and England.
Giovanni Villani,
historian and man of finance, noted that in 1308, there were 300 factories in
Florence producing 100,000 pieces of wool cloth each year. But the cloth was
"coarser" and of only half the value, having no intermixture of English wool,
which indeed they had not yet learned to dress. By 1338, there were only 200
factories turning out from 70,000 to 80,000 peices of cloth each year. There
was a decline in production of from 20 to 30 per cent over a 30-year period. 10
The Wool Guild and Guild of Calimala (dressers of foreign cloth) were the
chief organizations of producers in early fourteenth century Florence. Both
Italy was unable to provide
were in a difficult position during this period.
them with raw materials. In addition their northern competitors were cutting
into their markets. Villani makes no mention of the Silk Guild in his minute,
survey of Florentine industry in 1338. Professor Villari assumes that the Guild
must have made little progress during that period. 11 As the woolen industry
began to decline, Florence began to concentrate its energies on the silk industry. The markets which had been lost to woolen manufacturers
were being reconquered by the silk manufacturers.
However, the expansion of the manufacture
of delicate gold and silver brocades did not occur until the beginning of the
fifteenth century. There was a period of almost 100 years during which the two
principal industries declined with no other industry to compensate for the
economic losses.
In the matter of banking, we witness a similar decline during the first
half of the fourteenth century. 12 Stemming from their commercial relations with
the markets of the East, large amounts of specie found their way into the hands
of Florentine bankers. 13 The development of letters of exchange (lettere di
cambio), the shares of the public debt (luoghi del Monte) and the evolution of
branch banking were all symptoms of- the advance of finance capitalism in Florence. 14 In 1338 the Guild of Money-changers maintained about 80 money-changers'
stalls.
Florence coined about 350,000 to 400,000 gold florins. 15
The solvency of the Florentine banking system was dealt a serious blow in
1339. On May 6, Edward IIIof England suspended payment of his debts to the two
largest and most powerful financial houses, the Bardi and the Peruzzi. The loss
was about three times the total annual revenue of the Republic. 16
The decline of the wool industry and the bankruptcy of the money-changers
between 1339 and 1342 were serious factors in destroying the commune. However,
it was in the area of foreign affairs that the Republican constitution of the
medieval commune suffered its deepest hurt. Communal institutions were incompatible with the Florentine imperial ventures of the fourteenth century. The
commune was organized on a bourgeois base.
The burghers had united against the
nobles and broken their power. When they took over the government, they did not
have the military power to pursue imperialistic ventures. Military expansion
had to be carried out by mercenaries.
Citizen armies made up of the bourgeoisie
were less than ineffectual against their well-armed feudal opponents.
Warfare
in the fourteenth century required a lifetime of training and practice. 1^
The military history of the period was begun by the invasions of Henry
VII.18 Florence joined with Robert, King of Naples, and the burghers granted
him lordship of the city. 19 The failure of Henry to break the resistance of the
Florentines and his untimely death, removed the threat of the Germans from the
banks of the Arno. 20
The imperial party had lost a chief ( un condottiero ispirato dalla divini~
t a") , but they had not lost hope of carrying on the war. Under Uguccione del la
Faggiuola and then Castruccio Castracani the enemies of the city of the Red Lily
began to gain the upper hand. The burghers and their allies were defeated at
Montecatini in August of 1315. 21 Ten years later, the Republic was defeated at
the battle of Altopascio. 22 So great was the fear of the merchants for the
safety of the city, that they offered Charles, the son of their ally, the King
of Naples, lordship over their city. He agreed to provide the military power
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requisite for their security and survival. 23 His dictatorship in itself is not
significant. He did little to change the power relationships in Tuscany.
What
is significant is the breakdown of the old communal pattern. The old Republican
constitution was adequate for ruling an isolated, prosperous medieval community.
It was not suitable for governing a state fighting for markets and survival.
The next 15 years of Florentine history were directed towards one purpose-the conquest of the city of Lucca.
Villani and many others believed this policy
to be foolish. 24 They felt it had been engineered by the Florentine capitalists
who drove the Republic to this acquisition under the pressure of private interests of state.
It seems doubtful that the Medici, Strozzi, Peruzzi, Albizzi,
Mozzi, etc., consciously betrayed their state. Rather they failed to gain the
city of Lucca because they did not have the experience to conduct a prolonged
war. 25

Not only were their imperialistic ventures doomed to failure, but in October of 1341, the city of Lucca fell into the hands of the loathed Pisans. 26
The merchants had not only lost the prize to the city, and Dante prayed the
raging Arno might inundate and drown every man and mouse, 27 but also they had
contracted a debt of 800,000 golden florins. The merchants were bankrupt by
Edward's repudiation of his debt. The wool industry had declined. And now the
city treasury was empty. 28
The danger of Henry VII's invasion had brought on Robert of Naples' lordship over the city. 29 The threat of Castruccio had occasioned the dictatorship
of the Duke of Calabria. 30 Finally the capture of Lucca by Pisa, caused the
dictatorship of the Duke of Athens. Evidently the external politics brought
about sinister repercussions in the internal affairs of the Republic. Dictatorship, while it is the form of government least compatible with medieval communal
institutions, appeared to be the only one in accord with the realizations of the
objectives of Florentine imperialism. 31
Dictatorship was supported by all groups in the society. 32 No group
manifested faith in republican institutions in this time of crises.
There was
no opposition to the dictatorship of the Duke of Athens. 33 There had been
equally little opposition to establishing a Signoria in the past. The threat
of Pisa, or Henry VII, or Castruccio, quickly broke the citizens' loyalty to
"liberal institutions." Safety and self-interest were of more significance than
abstract principles of government. 34 The Commune was incapable of solving the
complex foreign and domestic problems. Perhaps a foreign dictator could succeed
where the domestic oligarchy had failed. Caggese and Sapori both suggest that
the most fundamental reason for the decline of republican institutions, was
moral. 3^ We witness the decline of the communal morality. The minds of the
Florentines are enclosed; they are invaded with a sense of indefinable disgust,
of languor, of prostration and pessimism. 36 As a sanguine expectation for a
solution to the problems disappeared, so in direct proportion did the traditional morality of the classes. 37 These conjectures cannot be proven by the historIn the face of military and financial bankian--they can only be suggested.
ruptcy, we assume the emergence of the morality of Proto-Fascism!
The destruction of the feudal economy, law and culture by the artisans, speculators and
workers, had been going on since the eleventh century.
The end of the old
morality and emergence of the new, does not appear as definitive as the two
historians have suggested.
It may be a factor. Guelph versus Ghibelline, civil
war between the nobles and the haute bourgeoisie,
the papacy of Boniface VIII,
and the failure of the invasion of Henry VII, had undoubtedly disillusioned more
Florentines than Petrarch and Dante. 38
More significant perhaps than the decline of the old morality is the
decline of the medieval state. Through the late thirteenth and early fourteenth
century, the Commune began to lose its original quality.
Conflicts between
Parties offered neither a program
various groups had no theoretical basis.
aiming toward stability nor toward a new society. The state was controlled by
the strong, who were motivated by a hatred and a desire for revenge against the
weak. Laws and elections were used to expell numerous citizens.
The exiles and
rebels were then willing to resort to any means to overthrow the state. The
dominant groups and the exiles became ever more partisan. Neither group was
concerned with the interests of society. Each group tried to turn the situation
to its own advantage.
This was especially true of the nobles. They hated and
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despised the Ordinances of Justice which curtailed their power in the state. 39
They bided their time until the attention of the government was diverted by some
foreign threat. Then they would establish a government to their liking. Other
The state appointed special police
groups were anxious to subvert the state.
to serve to check the Ghibellines. 40 The division between the Guelfs and the
Special
Ghibellines had created two Republics, two communes, and two societies.
courts had to be established to administer the property of certain of the
rebels. 41 In 1316, King Robert of Napes, sent a vicar to Florence. He was to
be given power for 8 years to dissolve the enmity between citizens. 42 Not only
did the vicar fail to dispel hatred between citizens but he had to face the
redoubled enmity of the citizenry against his master, King Robert. 43
Equally as decisive was the hatred of the little people {popolo minuto)
against their social and economic superiors. 44 The people were continuously in
arms because they were afraid of the armed magnates and exerted great pressure
on the state. 45 The heavy taxes fell on the popolo minuto and they were seriThey were infuriated by a foreign policy which cost them
ously dissatisfied.
so many of their hard-earned florins. They, along with the other groups, were
For to them, a dictatorship
willing and anxious to support a dictatorship.
might prove to be the only way out--economically and politically--of the dilemna
in which they found themselves.
The history of the city during the fourteenth century, demonstrated the
instability of political institutions. Economic and social shifts occasioned
It was not until the fifteenth century that political
political changes.
Perhaps this was due less to the Medici than to the
stability was achieved.
permanence

of the social and economic fabric.
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